Nouri al-Maliki's divisive rule helped create crisis in Iraq

The oppressiveand vindictive rule of Iraqi Prime Minister Nourial-Maliki, whose divisivegoverning has alienated and marginalized Sunnis and Kurds,has played a significant role in the deteriorationof securityand the emergence of Sunni extremists,experts on the troubled country say.

"I believe a great deal of the crisis can be laid at the feet of Nouri al-Maliki," said Peter Mansoor, the former executive officer to then general David Petraeusduring the period of the Iraqi surge in 2007 and 2008. "Ever since the withdrawal of U.S. forces in 2011, hes proven to be a highly divisive, extremely authoritarianand extremely sectarian figure.

"Hes governed Iraq with an iron fist, he has alienated large segments of the Iraqi population, including its Sunni and Kurdish inhabitants, and his governingstyle has led directly to this moment when hes lost control of more of third of his country."

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The al-Qaeda-inspired Islamic State inIraq and Syria (ISIS) has overrun several Iraqi cities and posed the worst threat to the Shia-led government since U.S. troops left in 2011.

"Ibelievethat had Nouri al-Maliki made a serious effort toreconcilewith the Sunnicommunity andKurdish community andgovernedin a more even-handed manner, that the region wouldnt be in this position today," saidMansoor, author of the bookSurge: My Journey with General David Petraeus and the Remaking of the Iraq War.

"It says something when the Sunnisfeel so bad about theway theyve been treated thatthey wouldforge a temporaryalliance with these very extremistjihadists."

Al-Maliki, the Shia leader of theDawaParty,became prime minister in2006, when he was initially seen asthe compromise candidate, a somewhat weak leader who wasacceptable to all factions, and possibly viewed as someone who could be controlled.

'Ready to go after his political enemies'

Initially, during the so-called U.Ssurge in 2008 againstal-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Maliki helped in the fight against the insurgencyand was considered even-handed in going after Sunni and Shia extremists, Mansoor said.

"That turned out notto be thecasein thelong run," Mansoorsaid. "Once hethoughthe had won, thenhewas ready to go after hispoliticalenemies, and heviewedthose enemies very much in a sectarian lens."

Instead of reaching out to other factions, al-Maliki beganarresting Sunni citizens andkey Sunni politicians, and putting them in jail without trial. Meanwhile, he packed the courts with his political cronies and further marginalized the Sunni community by not providing them with afairshareof budget resources, Mansoor said.

"So in just aboutevery way you can imagine,he has alienated the Sunni community,and unfortunatelywhat that has done,it has turned them against the government that they appearedto be on the verge of supporting after the successofthe surge," Mansoor said.

And byundermining the reconciliationand reintegration of Sunni Arabs, in particular the Sunni militiaknown as the Awakening Council (Sons of Iraq) who fought with U.S. and Iraqi forces during the height of the insurgency, al-Maliki hasweakened Iraq's defence,said Derek Harvey, a former intelligence analyst for Iraq whoserved as a policy adviser toPetraeus.

Afairly stable situation wasaggravatedsignificantlyby Prime Minister Malikisdecisionandreluctancetoengagein a political process that wouldhavebeen moreinclusive," Harvey said. "And, in fact, he took apart what we had built up the previous year, brick by brick by brick."

Al-Malikialso began purging competent professional officers whom the U.S had spent years training and developing because they were not "party hacks," Harvey said, andwere not family members or otherwise connected to the prime minister and the DawaParty.

This meant theability of the Iraqisto respond effectivelyto the recentdevelopments in the northhave beenundermined by the lack of support from the Sons of Iraq, the incompetence ofofficersin charge and by having commandand intelligencemicromanaged by the prime minister's office, Harvey added.

"So commanders and staff and others had nobattlefield awareness,and so theywere stuck blind on these posts without good leaders," hesaid. "Are you going to fight for that,if you're a Shiasoldierin Mosulor Tikrit, whenyousee the leadersabandoning or not competent?"

Harvey said thisoutcome was clearly predictable and blamed the Obama administration in part for not pushing to maintain a large U.S. force in Iraq thatcould keep the training and mentoring of the Iraqi military ontrack andcontinue toprofessionalize it.

But also, he said, "So we couldbe a check on the worst tendencies of Prime Minister Maliki and others."