Ukraine crisis: 7 questions answered

No one saw it coming. That's theone thing most observers ofRussia's recent military incursion intoCrimeaagree on. While many expected President Vladimir Putin to reassert Russia's control over its strategically important naval basein the semi-autonomous region following the ouster of UkrainianPresidentViktorYanukovych, few expected him to do it so brazenly.

Although academics who study the region are feeling gun shy these days about making predictions, we managed to getthree expertsto answer some key questions about the crisis and how it might evolve.

1. What was Putin thinking?

World leaders and regional analysts have admitted that it's hard to tell exactly what Putin is thinking these days. After speakingwith the Russian leader, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly told U.S. President Barack Obamathat he seemed to be "'in another world," but experts say there are a few possible explanations for why Putin decided to deploy 16,000Russian troops from the Black Sea port of Sevastopol to take territorial control over Crimea:

Humiliation. The overthrow of Yanukovych was "deeply humiliating" for Putin, and it's possible hewantedto respond aggressively toshow hisown people that Russia is not weak and won't be humiliated, saidLucanWay,a political science professor in the Centre for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies at the University of Toronto'sMunkCentre for Global Affairs.

"Russia really hates it when it feels disrespected, and sometimes, it likes to do things just to show that it matters,even if there is no obvious end game,"Way said.

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Resentment over past humiliations that Russia has suffered at the hands of Western powers since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991has characterized Putin's reign, which has been largely about overcoming those humiliations and reasserting Russian power, says Terry Martin, the George F. Baker professor of Russian studies in Harvard University's history department.

One of those humiliations was watchingNATOexpand into Russia's backyard, despite Western assurances that it would not. Putin has made it known he won't tolerate further incursions,and his actions in Crimea could be read as a means of keepingNATOfrom its door by preventing another ex-Soviet republic from being absorbed into the military alliance.

"This is a country that has felt humiliated, and some of that humiliation is 'get over it,' and some of that humiliation is justified," said Martin, who also heads Harvard's Davis Centre for Russian and Eurasian Studies.

Discrediting the Ukrainian revolution to forestall a similar one at home. Russia's intervention in Ukraine sends a message to Russians that "this is what happens when you have these kind of revolutions: you have total chaos and civil war," Way said.

Calculated intimidation of the new government.In some respects, the best-case scenario, says Martin, would be ifPutin were simplyusing theCrimea incursion as a way of intimidating the new Ukrainian government into negotiating an agreement that would guarantee greater sovereignty for Crimea anda significant role in the new government for eastern regionsmore oriented toward Russia than the West.

Response to Western aggression. When looked at throughthe lens of Putin'spolitical rhetoric, which has painted the events in Ukraineas a revolutionfomented by the Westthat has installed an illegitimateregime of nationalistthugs intent on bringing Ukraine into NATO,the events amount to an act ofaggression that warrants a response.

"If you really believe the West has overthrown a legitimately elected pro-Russian president and fascists have taken over Kyiv, then Ithink their [Russia's]actions make a little bit more sense," Way said.

2. What will Putin do next?

Although the situation is evolving rapidly, at this stage, few in the international community believe that Putin will go so far as to take over other parts of Ukraine, namely, theeastern regions that favour an alliance with Russia.

"It will be difficult for Russia to do what they did in Crimea that is, to organize the takeover of, say, [the eastern city of] Donetsk withoutan actual invasion, and an invasion raisesthe temperatureon theforeign affairs scene so much that Ijust don't think that Putin would risk it," said Martin. "The temperature has already been raised enormously."

There's very little the West can do. You really cannot tell Putin what to do.Lucan Way, political scientist, Universityof Toronto

While many would consider Russia's deployment of troops in Crimea a de facto invasion, Martin says evidence so far suggests most of the troops were already in Crimea as part ofthe Black Sea fleet rather than being mobilized across the Russia-Ukraine border in the east, for example.

"It's a bit semantic," says Martin. "Let's say it was a moral equivalent of an invasion. They did it, but they didn't do it withoutlocal help.Idon't know how much local Crimean citizen paramilitaries were involved. That's all part of the stuff we may never know."

On Mondayat an emergency meeting of theUN Security Council, Russian and Ukrainian officials argued over just how many Russian troops are allowed to bedeployed in Crimea under existing treaties governing Russia's use of the Sevastopol naval base. Russiasaid 25,000 while Ukraine insisted on 11,000.

3. How will the West react?

"There's very little the West can do," says Way of any possibilityof Western intervention in Crimea. "Russia isa big country, it has big army, ithas nuclear weapons,it provides a good chunk of the energy for Europe. You really cannot tell Putin what to do."

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The leaders of the U.S., Canada and European countries have signalled that they may pull out of theJune summit ofG8countiesinSochi in protest over Russia's actions in Crimea, and several countries have threatened to impose economic sanctionson Russia. On Monday, the United Nations held its thirdemergency meeting of the Security Council onto discuss the Russian incursion, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has said it will send monitors to Crimea.

But the three experts we talked to all agreed that such actions are unlikely to have much effect on Russia itself.

"Outside ofWorldWar III, all you can do is longer-termthingslike travel bans and make itmore costly for Putin, but these are not the kind of things that are going toconvince Russiato leave Crimea," said Way.

"This is obviously going to isolate him and undermine the Russian economy, but clearly, he's already taken that into account."

NATO's hands, too, are tied,saysJeffSahadeo, director of the Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies atCarletonUniversity. It learned itslesson in 2008 in the Georgian-Russian war overSouth Ossetia when it sent ships to Georgian ports on the Black Sea and Georgia took that as sign that it would back its incursion into the autonomous region on the Russian border.

"If they make even pro-Ukrainestatements or move warships or scramble forces, that might [inspire] some of themore radical forces in Ukraine to think they're going to get support from the Westand try and trigger some kind ofprovocation,which is what happened in the Georgian case," Sahadeosaid.

4. Will Crimea play out like South Ossetia?

Many have compared the current situation in Crimea to Russia's intervention in the autonomous region of South Ossetiain Georgia in 2008, but analysts say there are key differences. Russia's entry into South Ossetiawas not asimple case of military aggression, saysWay, but was provoked largelyby Georgia's attempt to assertcontrol over the region by launching a militaryassault.

"Here, there is absolutely zero provocation by the Ukrainianauthorities,"said Way. "They're [Russia]talking about defending themselves, but against whom? It's totally unclear. This [threat] is completely manufactured."

While Russiaexploited the discontent in South Ossetiain order tode facto remove the autonomous region from Georgian state control, the stakes this time are much higher, said Martin.

"The symbolic and geopolitical importanceof Crimea dwarfs South Ossetia," he said.

Today, Russia considers South Ossetia and another breakaway Georgian territory, Abkhazia to be independent, but most of the rest of the world does not recognize these territories as sovereignstates. It remains to be seen whether the Crimean conflict will result in a similar outcome.

5. What do the pro-Russia Ukrainians want to happen?

Although Crimea and eastern Ukraine have large Russian populations and pro-Russian actors likely helped Russia execute its incursion into Crimea,that doesnot necessarily mean these regions want to splitfromUkraineand join Russia.

Theelites ineasternUkrainedo notwantto become provinces of Russia.Terry Martin, historian, Harvard University

Pro-Russia sentiment in the east and south has been stokedin the aftermath of the violent protests in Kyivby activists who took their cues from their counterparts in western Ukraine, who organized largerallies and took over regional governments, says Way. This, heand Martin say, has perhaps created an inflated impression of pro-Russiasupport.

"Even in Crimea, would there be major support for separation from Ukraine? Probably notat a calm time," says Martin. "Would there be anywhere else in Ukraine? It does not seem so, and,moreover, theelites in easternUkraine do not want to become provinces of Russia....

"These elites have a good situation in Ukraine. In Russia, they'll just be some third-rate, fourth-rate, fifth-rate oligarchs,and they'll be under somebody that has shown he can dealwith oligarchs."

Ukraine's eastern elites will be perfectly happy if Russia's recent intimidation tactics leadto a better deal for them within Ukraine, and they are already being courted by the new interim government, which has begun appointing the east's most powerful oligarchs to governorships in easternUkraine.

"It's a smart move," says Martin. "These are the people who can create trouble."

The other population to keep in mind are the Tatars, who make up about 12 to 15 per cent of the population in Crimea (to Russians' 60 per cent) and consider themselves the people most indigenous to the region. They have a fraught history with Russia and have generally allied themselves with the Ukrainian part of the population. Although their ultimate hope would be to have their own autonomous Tatar republic, "they're realists,"says Martin, and are likely to favour remaining part of Ukraine over Russian annexation or Crimean independence.

6. Who will fund a bankrupt Ukraine?

Ukraine is on the brink of defaulting on its debt and needs about $35billion US over the next two years to stay solvent, according to its interim finance minister.With the $15 billion Russia promised the country under Yanukovych's regime now off the table, Ukraine needs a newbenefactor and fast.

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The International Monetary Fund has pledged its support and will likelyprovide short-term financial aid to shore up the country's currency and ensure that basic payments such as pensions and government salaries are made, but ensuring that whoever comes to power in the elections planned for May putsfuture bailout funds togood use is the greater challenge, says Sahadeo.

When you have a lot ofguns and a lot of youngconscript soldiers who have been pumped full ofnationalist rhetoric and are nervous, that's the real danger.JeffSahadeo, political scientist,CarletonUniversity

"I think there are a lot of questions that the U.S. and Europe have to ask themselves about whom do they tie their fortunes to," he said.

"The U.S. and the EUarejust kindofavoidingthe question rightnow. In a way, the focus on Russiamakesit a little biteasierfor themto not talk about it."

The smart move for Putin would be to de-escalatethe current situationand sit back and watch the West try todeal with the mess that is thecurrent state of Ukraine's economy, Sahadeo said.

"Putin could probably look good just by sort of swooping in a year from now and saying, 'OK, the West has failed you. I'm here nowI have your interests at heart,'" hesaid.

7. What is the biggest future threat?

"The one thing Iworry about is the unpredictability," saysSahadeo."When you have a lot ofguns and a lot of youngconscript soldiers who have been pumped full ofnationalist rhetoric and are nervous, that's the real danger thatthere'll be some kind of unscripted confrontation that will lead to one person firing a weapon and a few more people firing a weapon and thecivilian population getting involved. That's something that really makes me nervous much more than somethinghappening at the international level."

Another real threat, says Sahadeo, is thatthewell-armed nationalist groups who succeeded in oustingYanukovych will carry outsome kind of guerrilla actionsagainst pro-Russian forces within Crimea or inthe easternregions.

"Let's saya conflict in Donetsk broke out and thepro-Russialeadership in Donetskappealed to Putin for intervention, then what then? That'swhere it gets really scary."